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World food commodities prices increased 130 percent from January 2002 to July 
2008. Individual agricultural commodities show even more pronounced increases: 
corn, wheat, rice and soybeans rose by 190, 162, 318 and 246 percent, 
respectively. Since July, food commodities prices began to fall.  While this decline 
comes as a relief, prices are likely to stay high in the foreseeable future. Available 
evidence suggests that the decline in living standards of net consumers caused by 
higher food prices outweighs the benefits accruing to poor net sellers in the majority 
of countries that have been analyzed so far. The time to implement measures to 
help the poor net consumers cope with higher food prices is now.  However, too 
many developing countries lack the instruments, administrative capacity and fiscal 
space to implement safety nets fast enough and in the required scale.  This is one 
of the most pressing policy challenges that we face. For the poor who are net 
sellers, governments should seize the opportunity to convert the short-run windfall 
into longer-term gains. Multilateral financial institutions can play a key role in 
providing financial resources to countries facing negative terms of trade shocks, 
technical assistance in the design of safety nets and resources to add fiscal space 
to countries to fund safety net programs. International organizations can also help 
countries design the appropriate macroeconomic policy response.  This will call for 
greater flexibility in the menu of policy options traditionally deployed by the Bretton 
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Abstract 
 
World food commodities prices increased 130 percent from January 2002 to July 2008. 
Individual agricultural commodities show even more pronounced increases: corn, wheat, rice 
and soybeans rose by 190, 162, 318 and 246 percent, respectively. Since July, food commodities 
prices began to fall.  While this decline comes as a relief, prices are likely to stay high in the 
foreseeable future. Rising food prices are a cause of major concern because they bring 
significant and immediate setbacks for poverty reduction, social stability, inflation and a rules-
based trading system.  There are three main drivers of rising food prices: long-term supply-side 
weaknesses, a change in demand due to the surge in the production of biofuels starting in 2004, 
and the combination of macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower 
interest rates in the United States with export-restricting policies on the part of developing 
countries since mid-2007. Higher world food commodities prices cause significant inflationary 
pressures for developing countries.  One key policy dilemma is to what extent governments 
should allow the changes in world food commodities prices to be passed through to domestic 
prices.  If the increase is a reflection of a global inflationary process, partially insulating 
domestic food prices may be the most adequate response.   Many developing countries have 
chosen this path. The use of policy interventions that put a wedge between domestic and 
international prices exacerbates the price pressures in world markets for the affected 
commodities. Without a credible multilateral solution to large food price fluctuations, however, 
it is not surprising that countries pursue what is perceived as best for them even if the rest of the 
world is worse off as a result.  A rules-based trading system should include safeguards and 
mechanisms which would make the protection of domestic consumers and producers from 
large—and recurrent-- food commodities price fluctuations (in either direction) orderly and 
legitimate. Available evidence suggests that the decline in living standards of net consumers 
caused by higher food prices outweighs the benefits accruing to poor net sellers in the majority 
of countries that have been analyzed so far. Implementing measures to help the poor net 
consumers cope with higher food prices are of the essence.  However, too many developing 
countries lack the instruments, administrative capacity and fiscal space to implement safety nets 
fast enough and in the required scale.  This is one of the most pressing policy challenges that we 
face. For the poor who are net sellers, governments should seize the opportunity to convert the 
short-run windfall into longer-term gains. Multilateral financial institutions can play a key role 
in providing financial resources to countries facing negative terms of trade shocks, technical 
assistance in the design of safety nets and resources to add fiscal space to countries to fund 
safety net programs. International organizations can also help countries design the appropriate 
macroeconomic policy response.  This will call for greater flexibility in the menu of policy 
options traditionally deployed by the Bretton Woods institutions.  
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Introduction 
 
After three consecutive decades of decline
3, world prices of food commodities 
have risen over the past five years at an alarming pace. (Figure 1)  Between 2003 and 
2008, world prices for meat and poultry nearly doubled, corn and wheat prices more 
than doubled, and butter and milk prices grew three times.  An extreme example comes 
as the price of rice doubled in the lapse of four months! Since July 2008, food 
commodities prices began to fall.  However, while this decline comes as a relief, food 
commodities prices are likely to stay high—significantly higher than at the end of the 
last decade-- in the foreseeable future.  
 
Rising food prices are a cause of major concern because high food prices bring 
significant and immediate setbacks for poverty reduction, social stability, inflation and a 
rules-based trading system.  Food prices are unique since food is unlike any other good. 
Food is not simply a source of pleasure. Food is essential for survival; it is the most 
basic of basic needs.   Access to basic nutrition permits humans to live, work, reproduce 
and fend off disease.  It should come as no surprise that the poor themselves list hunger 
and food insecurity as their core concerns.
4 Food is special from the production point of 
view as well.  It is the key ingredient in generating human energy, and human energy is 
essential to any, and all, economic activity. If food becomes permanently more 
expensive, long-term economic growth in the poorest countries could slow down.   
 
What are the main causes of rising food prices? Are the increases in food 
commodities prices a change in their relative price (i.e., in their “true” relative scarcity) 
or part of a monetary phenomenon—that is, higher global inflation?  To what extent is 
the increase in food commodities prices market-driven or policy induced?  What are the 
short-term macroeconomic consequences of higher food commodities prices and how 
do they affect the living standards of the poor? What are the appropriate short-term 
policy responses on the part of developing countries? What policies should multilateral 
financial organizations support?  
 
                                                 
3 The long-term decline observed in international prices of wheat and corn dates back earlier than the 
1970s. The U.S. price of wheat in constant value in the 1980s was approximately half what it had been 
100 years earlier (!). Less dramatic but not less significant, the decline in corn prices started after World 
War II. (Schuh, 1987, Figure 3-1, p.76).  
4 Narayan et al (2000), Chapter 2.    3
There are three major drivers of rising world food commodities prices: long-term 
supply-side weaknesses, a change in demand due to the surge in the production of 
biofuels starting in 2004, and the combination of macroeconomic factors such as the 
depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates in the United States with export-
restricting policies on the part of developing countries since mid-2007. In other words, 
the increase in food commodities prices is both a real and a monetary phenomenon and 
both market-driven and policy-induced.  
 
Higher world food commodities prices cause macroeconomic imbalances for net 
food commodities importers and inflationary pressures for both net importers and net 
exporters.  One key policy dilemma is to what extent governments should allow the 
changes in world food commodities prices to be passed through to domestic prices.  
This depends on the extent to which world food price increases reflect a real (and 
permanent) change in their opportunity cost or a monetary phenomenon. If it is a change 
in the relative price, domestic prices should be allowed to align themselves with 
international prices. But to the extent that the increase is part of a global inflationary 
process, allowing domestic relative prices to align themselves with international prices 
in full is not necessarily the most adequate policy response.  As we shall see, many 
developing countries have chosen to (partially) insulate the domestic prices of food with 
a range of policy interventions. 
 
Does poverty increase or fall with higher food prices?
5 Since the poor include 
both net consumers and net sellers of food commodities, a change in their price in either 
direction will inevitably hurt some of the poor and benefit some of the poor at the same 
time. Available evidence suggests that among the poorest of the poor, the decline in 
living standards of net consumers caused by higher food prices outweighs the benefits 
accruing to net sellers in the majority of countries that have been analyzed so far. 
Implementing measures to help the poor net consumers cope with higher food prices are 
of the essence.  However, as we shall see, too many developing countries lack the 
instruments, administrative capacity and fiscal space to implement safety nets fast 
                                                 
5The impact of higher food commodities prices on poverty has been the subject of some debate. Polaski 
(2008) and Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008)argue that many of the poor are net sellers of food 
commodities so that higher prices is a benefit to them while many others emphasize the negative net 
impact on the headcount and poverty gap ratios as illustrations of how higher food prices are hurting the 
poor (Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Wodon et al., 2008; Robles et al., 2008; CEPAL, 2008).   4
enough and in the required scale.  This is one of the most pressing policy challenges that 
we face. For the poor who are net sellers, on the other hand, governments should seize 
the opportunity to convert the short-run windfall into longer-term gains. 
 
Multilateral financial institutions can play a key role in providing financial 
resources to allow countries that are facing negative terms of trade shocks (that is, net 
importers of commodities) to gradually (as opposed to abruptly) adjust to adverse 
external conditions.  They can also provide technical assistance in the design of safety 
nets and add fiscal space to countries that need external resources to fund them. Finally, 
international organizations can help countries design the appropriate macroeconomic 
policy response.  This will call for greater flexibility in the menu of policy options 
traditionally deployed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Such flexibility may have high 
pay-off not just for the countries themselves but for a rules-based trading system which 
has been weakened by myriad of unilateral decisions that restrict the flow of food 
commodities in the international markets. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I analyze the causes of rising 
food commodities prices; in particular, I discuss the role played by structural (declines 
in yield growth rates and the role played by corn- and oilseed-based biofuel production), 
idiosyncratic (e.g., bad weather) and macroeconomic factors (such as the depreciation of 
the dollar and the reduction in US interest rates after mid-June 2007). In Section 2, I 
look at how governments have been coping with the inflationary pressures and discuss 
under which circumstances putting a wedge between international and domestic prices 
may or may not be appropriate. I also examine the potential impact of higher food 
commodities prices on poverty and whether governments in developing countries are 
well equipped to deal with this impact.  In Section 3, I present the main conclusions. 
 
1. Why did food prices rise? 
 
By every indicator, world food commodities prices have risen substantially. The 
IMF’s index of internationally traded food commodities prices
6 increased 130 percent 
                                                 
6  A nominal dollar index of food commodity prices using global export value weights. It includes cereals, 
vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges price indices.   5
from January 2002 to July 2008.
7 (Figure 2) Individual agricultural commodities show 
even more pronounced increases. For example, from January 2002 to July 2008 the 
international price of corn, wheat, rice and soybeans rose by 190, 162, 318 and 246 
percent, respectively. (Figure 3)
8   
 
Although rising food prices were previously noticed (and noted)
9, it was not 
until the second half of 2007—and, in particular, in the first quarter of 2008—that 
soaring food prices took center stage among the world’s most pressing issues.
10 There is 
of course reason for this lagged response. Although food prices have risen since 2002, 
the rate at which food prices increased accelerated from the second half of 2007 until 
June 2008. Between July 2007 and June 2008 prices rose by 42 percent; this is 
equivalent to a third of the increase observed from January 2002 onwards in 15 percent 
of the time.
 11  
 
Why did food prices rise? Are the price increases policy-induced or market 
driven? Are they temporary or permanent? To what extent are food commodities price 
increases changes in their relative price or a monetary phenomenon—i.e., part of a 
global inflationary process--?  As we shall see in this section, there are at least three 
                                                 
7 In July 2008 prices started to fall. The increase between January 2002 and June 2008 equaled 130 
percent. 
8 Data from IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Prices for corn refer to Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 
Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tone; for wheat to Wheat, No.1 Hard Red 
Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne; for rice to Rice, 5 percent broken 
milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per metric tonne; finally, for soybeans to Soybeans, 
U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per 
metric tonne. 
9 See, for example, the World Development Report 2008 “Agriculture for Development” (World Bank, 
2007), the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2007-2016 (OECD-FAO, 2007) and IFPRI’s Food Policy 
Report published in December 2007 (Von Braun, 2007).  
10 See, for example, the article published by the United Nations Secretary General in the Washington Post 
in March 2008 about food prices and its implications for food aid and development (Ban Ki-moon, 2008). 
Although not a comprehensive list, see also Abbott et al. (2008); Asian Development Bank (2008); Aksoy 
and Isik-Dikmelik (2008); Calvo (2008); CSIS (2008); CEPAL (2008); Collins (2008); CLAAF (2008); 
Dawe (2008); De Hoyos, Dessus and Herrera (2008); Elliot (2008); FAO (2008a); FAO (2008b); Frankel 
(2008a); Frankel (2008b) Frankel (2008c); IMF (2008); Ivanic and Martin (2008); Krichene (2008); 
Lipsky (2008); Lustig (2008a); Lustig (2008b); Mitchell (2008); Naylor and Falcon (2008); OECD 
(2008); ODS-UNDP (2008); Polaski (2008); RBLAC-UNDP (2008); Robles et al. (2008); Rojas-Suarez 
(2008); Rosegrant et al. (2008); Rosegrant (2008); Rosen et al. (2008); SELA (2008); Slayton and 
Timmer (2008); Subramanian (2008); Timmer (2008); UNCTAD (2008); United States Government 
Accountability Office (2008); Wodon et al. (2008); World Bank (2008a); World Bank (2008b); World 
Bank (2008c); World Bank (2008d); Von Braun (2008a); Von Braun (2008b); Von Braun (2008c); 
Zoellick (2008).    
11  Between October 2007 and June 2008, for example, they rose by 31 percent; this is equivalent to 
almost a quarter of the increase observed from January 2002 onwards in about a tenth of the time. A 
nominal dollar index of food commodity prices using global export value weights.    6
distinct processes that explain the price increases starting in 2002: i. the reversal in the 
long-term trend of falling food commodity prices due to supply side constraints; ii. the 
increase in food commodity prices due to the structural shift in demand associated with 
the production of corn-based and oilseeds-based biofuels; and, iii. the acceleration—and 
overshooting-- of price increases since mid-2007 associated with expansionary 
monetary policy in the US and export-restricting government interventions in 
developing countries. 
 
A wide range of factors have been identified as potentially significant to explain the 
phenomenon of rising food prices. (Table 1) Some are specific to the commodity 
markets while others are macroeconomic in nature. Some are market-driven while 
others are policy-induced, and some are both.  Some take the form of short-run shocks 
while others are the result of structural changes.  
 
Given the methodological difficulties involved, an attempt to estimate the exact 
contribution of each of these factors using econometrics or a comprehensive simulation 
model would be an impossible task. Instead, we will pursue an alternative approach: the 
process-tracing method which through the use of hypotheses, analytic explanations and 
a variety of empirical evidence—some more robust than other-- attempts to identify the 
intervening causal processes behind the recent episode of increases in food commodities 
prices.
 12  The presence of equifinality (the same outcome can be the result of alternative 
causal paths) makes the present explanations not conclusive enough for rigorous theory 
testing.  However, the following analyses will allow us to find some causes more 
probable than others and help draw specific hypotheses for further scrutiny in the future. 
 
Reversal of the Long-term Trend of Falling Food Commodities Prices 
 
By and large, the performance of agriculture over the past twenty five years has 
been viewed as a success story. According to the World Development Report (2008), 
for example, “…[F]rom 1980 to 2004, the gross domestic product (GDP) of agriculture 
expanded globally by an average of 2.0 percent a year, more than the population growth 
of 1.6 percent a year. This growth, driven by increasing productivity, pushed down the 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the process-tracing method, see George and Bennett (2005).    7
real price of grains in world markets by about 1.8 percent a year over the same period. 
… Due to rising productivity, prices have been declining for cereals—especially for 
rice, the developing world’s major food staple—and for traditional developing-world 
export products, such as cotton and coffee”
13 Of course, low prices were also the 




However, at the turn of the century, this success story was coming to an end and 
standard models predicted that food prices would rise by 0.26 percent per year until 
2030 and 0.82 percent per year from 2030 to 2050.
15 What factors were behind this 
anticipated change? Contrary to the neo-Malthusian view that has characterized much of 
the public discussion, per capita consumption of cereals and meat was predicted to fall 
because of lower population growth as well as the per capita food consumption levels 
already attained in populous developing countries.
16  The International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) projections for demand to 2025–30 and 2050 predicted that 
growth in cereal consumption would slow from 1.9 percent a year during 1969-1999 to 
1.3 percent a year during 2000-2030 and that growth in meat consumption would also 
slow from 2.9 percent to 1.7 percent a year.
17  
 
The main sources behind the expected change in price trends stemmed from 
supply-side constraints arising from land and water scarcity and slow technical 
progress. In the more densely populated areas of the world—primarily Asia-- the land 
frontier has been exhausted.  In Latin America there is still room for land expansion but 
this often comes at the expense of tropical and subtropical forests. While in Sub-
Saharan Africa there is great potential for land expansion, this would require large 
investments in infrastructure, human capital and agricultural extension. Water is likely 
to become increasingly scarce and irrigated agriculture would have to compete with the 
demand from larger and larger industrial sectors and urban centers.  Climate change is 
likely to worsen the availability of arable land and water for agricultural use. Slowed 
R&D spending cautions one to expect technological breakthroughs any time soon.  The 
                                                 
13 World Bank (2007), p. 51.  
14 For a discussion on this see, for example, IFPRI (2003).  
15 World Bank (2007), p. 62.  
16 This is due to an overall slowing of population growth and the already high levels of per capita food 
consumption attained in some of the more populous countries such as China. (World Bank, 2007, p. 62). 
17 World Bank (2007), p. 61.  These are based on IFPRI’s “medium” scenario.   8
supply-side constraints had already started to manifest themselves as a decline in the 
growth rates of yields of major cereal crops in developing countries. 
 
Although models predicted prices to begin a rising trend, the orders of 
magnitude bear no resemblance with what happened to food prices in the past few 
years. As we saw above, from January 2002 to July 2008, the price index of 
internationally traded food commodities prices increased by 127 percent; about 20 
percent per year or 100 times more than the predictions of the “business as usual” 
scenarios (!).  The models are not meant to capture short-term fluctuations, but such a 
difference between predictions and actuality might be interpreted as a strong indicator 
that we are not living anymore in the “business as usual” world assumed by the models.  
 
 If future price increases were expected to be relatively moderate, what changed 
in such a fundamental way? Did demand for food consumption grow at unanticipated 
rates due to unprecedented global growth particularly in large emerging economies such 
as China and India? Did supply of food commodities grow at slower than expected rates 
due to low prices in the previous decade? Was supply systematically affected in a major 
way due to bad weather and disease? Were production costs much higher due to rising 
costs of energy-intensive inputs such as fertilizers and transportation? Was demand for 
food commodities significantly higher because of their use for biofuels production?   
 
The Impact of Biofuels on Food Commodities Prices  
 
Let us start by analyzing more closely what happened to demand and supply in 
the markets for grains and oilseeds from 2000 onwards.  Since around 2000, the stocks-
to-use ratio for grains and vegetable oils began to fall and reached its lowest level in 
decades and in 2004 it started to decline for oilseeds. (Figure 4)  This is a clear sign that 
demand was outpacing supply. But was it due to a decline in harvested area, lower 
yields due to bad weather and disease, rising demand for food consumption or an 
increase in demand for industrial—that is, biofuels—use?  
 
 Table 2 presents a summary of trends in harvested area, yields, food 
consumption, industrial use and stocks-to-use ratios for corn, rice, wheat and oilseeds. 
Evidence shows that there was a steady decline in harvested area (for corn and wheat in   9
particular) at the beginning of the decade, a likely result of low prices in the past.
18 Bad 
weather had a negative impact on yields and, on specific years, the yields fell below 
trend for wheat and rice in particular. However, the harvested area for corn, for 
example, rose sharply in response to higher prices and by mid-decade there were record 
global crops for corn and oilseeds.  These trends seem to indicate that supply (harvested 
area) was gradually responding to incentives and bad weather was neither generalized 
nor persistent. Between 2000 and 2007, for all grains, harvested area grew at 0.4 percent 
and yield grew at 1.3 percent per year, which combined, as we shall see below, should 
have been enough to cover growth in demand for food consumption purposes.
19  
 
On the demand side, consumption for food (including animal feed) of corn, 
wheat and rice was for the most part on trend.  Contrary to what is often mentioned in 
the press, there were no surges in consumption on the part of China or India (or by 
developing countries in the aggregate) for corn, wheat or rice. The exception is oilseeds 
(soybeans in particular) for which the demand from China increased above trend. 
Demand for food consumption (including animal feed) for all grains grew at 1.7 percent 
per year from 2000 to 2007.
20 Hence, excluding the demand for industrial use 
(biofuels), supply and demand grew at the same pace.  
 
In contrast, after legislation on mandates, tariffs, and subsidies was passed in the 
EU and the US
21, the demand for corn and vegetable oils for industrial use (biofuels) 
rose above trend and at an increasing rate. (Figures 5 and Table 3) The use of corn for 
ethanol grew rapidly from 2004 to 2007. Feed use of maize, which accounts for 65 
percent of global maize use, grew by only 1.5 percent per year from 2004 to 2007 while 
ethanol use grew by 36 percent per year and used 70 percent of the increase in global 
corn production.
22  Industrial use of vegetable oils (which includes biodiesel) grew by 
11 percent per annum from 2004 to 2007, compared with 3 percent per annum for food 
use.
23 It is estimated that about one-third of the increase in consumption from 2004 to 
2007 was due to biodiesel. In Figure 6 we can observe how price increases of corn and 
                                                 
18 Timmer (2008) estimates that lower prices in the previous decade explain around 53 percent of the 
increase. On the harvested area and yield by crop see, for example, Abbott et al. (2008). Also, see Naylor 
and Falcon (2008). 
19 Mitchell (2008). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Legislation was passed in 2005 and implemented in 2006. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Author’s calculations based on data from the PSD Database, USDA.   10
soybeans accelerated after the demand for corn-based ethanol experienced its rapid 
increase. 
 
In quantitative terms, the contribution of biofuels to the rise in food commodities 
prices has been estimated or calculated using different time periods and prices, different 
coverage of food products, and different methodologies.
24  The general conclusion that 
emerges from these exercises is that the contribution of the expansion of biofuels to 
observed price increases is quantitatively significant.  Collins (2008) estimated that 
around 60 percent of the increase in maize prices from 2006 to 2008 may have been due 
to the increase in maize used in ethanol.”
25 Mitchell (2008) concludes that “… the 
combination of higher energy prices and related increases in fertilizer prices and 
transport costs, and dollar weakness … explain 25-30 percent of the total price increase, 
and most of the remaining 70-75 percent increase in food commodities prices was due 
to biofuels and the related consequences of low grain stocks, large land use shifts, 
speculative activity and export bans.”
26 Using a general equilibrium model, Rosegrant, 
et al. (2008) estimated the impact of the acceleration in biofuel production on weighted 
cereal prices from 2000 to 2007 to be 30 percent in real terms.
27 
 
How much of the increase in food commodities prices is caused by policy-
induced increases in demand for biofuels as opposed to market forces such as higher 
gasoline prices (derived from higher oil prices)?  According to McPhail and Babcock 
(2008) eliminating federal
28 tax credits (for blending ethanol in gas) and tariffs—and, to 
a much lesser extent, mandates—in the United States would reduce ethanol production 
by 18.6 percent and the price of corn would decline by 14.5 percent. While significant, 
this leaves a large portion of the increase unexplained.  What other factors made the 
production of biofuels profitable? 
 
                                                 
24For example, computable general equilibrium models (Rosegrant et al., 2008) or partial equilibrium 
analysis (Collins, 2008) or estimated as an accounting residual (Mitchell, 2008). 
25 Mitchell (2008), p. 4. 
26 Ibid., p. 16. 
27 Also, in the short-run, the IMF estimated that the increased demand for biofuels accounted for 70 
percent of the increase in maize prices and 40 percent of the increase in soybean prices (Lipsky, May 8, 
2008). A recent OECD report (OECD, 2008) calculates that “current biofuel support measures are 
estimated to increase average wheat, maize and vegetable oil prices by about 5%, 7% and 19%, 
respectively, in the medium term” (p.9). 
28 In addition to policies at the federal level, there are mandates and other policies at the state level which 
also affect ethanol and biodiesel production. (Elliott, 2008)   11
One obvious candidate is higher gasoline prices.  If gasoline prices are 
sufficiently high, the production of biofuels may be profitable even without the 
mandates, tax credits and the like. There is a gas price for which the mandates and 
subsidies become unnecessary in order to make the production of biofuels financially 
profitable.  According to McPhail and Babcock (2008)
29, even if government support 
policies at the federal level are eliminated, if gas prices were to stay at 3 dollars per 
gallon or higher, ethanol production would rise from the current levels of 6.5 billion 
gallons to 14 billion gallons and corn price would stay at 4 dollars a bushel
30 (until 
recently prices were around 7 dollars a bushel). In fact, as Elliott (2008) shows the 
mandated levels required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005
31 in the United States were 
apparently non-binding. (Figure 7)
32 
 
Markets were undoubtedly “stressed” before the expansion of biofuels 
production.
 33 However, in the absence of the rise in demand for biofuels, the price 
increases would have been more moderate, especially for corn. In particular, one would 
have expected the price increases to subside in 2004/05 when there were record global 
harvests in corn and oilseeds.  Instead, price increases for corn accelerated.  Between 
January 2002 and January 2004, for example, the monthly rate of growth for corn prices 
was 1 percent on average while between January 2005 and June 2007 the monthly rate 
of growth rose to 2.4 percent on average. The surge in the demand for corn to be used as 
inputs in the production of corn-based biofuels is a natural “suspect” because of the 
additional pressure this placed on markets that were already tight. It is not just the 
increase in “physical” demand that matters here (that is, a horizontal shift in the demand 
curve due, for example, to political mandates).  It is also the fact that as oil prices rose, 
consumers were willing to pay higher prices for biofuels and producers were able to ask 
                                                 
29 http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_12943.pdf. 
30 A bushel is equal to 56 pounds. 
31 Signed into law (Public Law 109-58) by President Bush on August 8
th of 2005. 
32 This is not proof that the same increase in biofuels production would have existed without government 
support. It is still possible that without the tax credits or protection from imports, the production of 
biofuels at those same prices would have been lower. According to Naylor and Falcon (2008), in the 
absence of government support policies, oil prices would have to be high enough and corn prices low 
enough to make ethanol production profitable at 65 percent the price of gas . “…[E]thanol has only about 
two-thirds the energy of gasoline.  In other words, rational consumers would pay only about 65% of the 
price of gasoline for their ethanol, since their cars would go only about 65% as far on a tank of fuel.  
Since ethanol must be shipped and stored separately, substantial new infrastructure would be needed to 
make it a large-scale choice for fuel, and autos would require so-called “flex” technology to use fuel 
containing high percentages of ethanol.”  
33 For an estimate of the order of magnitude of the impact of past prices on current prices see Timmer 
(2008).   12
for higher prices (that is, a vertical shift in the demand and supply curves). The global 
agricultural markets are highly interconnected. There are complex interactions between 
corn and oilseeds and other crops such as rice or wheat through substitution on the 
demand or supply side.
34 If the price of the former goes up, through adjustments in 




The fact that food commodities have become a profitable alternative for the 
production of “non-human” energy has important implications.
36  In contrast to food 
being used for consumption purposes whose income-elasticity is below unity (that is, 
the rate of increase in per capita food consumption falls as income per capita grows or 
Engel’s Law), the income elasticity for food commodities used to produce nonhuman 
energy could equal unity or more.
37  This turn of events significantly alters the forces at 
play in food commodities markets and--depending on what happens to oil prices, 
biofuels subsidies and mandates and research on the agricultural frontier--food could 
                                                 
34 For example, in the US corn displaced soybeans in planted area and in the EU oilseeds displaced wheat. 
(Mitchell, 2008) 
35 For example, in 2007 harvested area for corn in the US rose by 23 percent “… in response to high 
maize prices and rapid demand growth for maize for ethanol production. This expansion resulted in a 16 
percent decline in soybean area (Figure 6) which reduced soybean production and contributed to a 75 
percent rise in soybean prices between April 2007 and April 2008.” (Mitchell, 2008, p. 10)  And, Naylor 
and Falcon (2008) described the interaction between ethanol, corn prices, soybean prices and wheat prices 
in the following account: “… Ethanol, while the beginning of the corn story, is far from the end of it.  
Corn’s other linkages to soybeans, wheat, and meat illustrate why it is the keystone in the food system.  
Midwestern farmers who produced the record corn crop in 2007 made a series of acreage decisions that 
reverberated around the world.  Corn area was up more than 15 million acres in 2007 in response to rising 
expected prices. That increase came mainly at the expense of soybeans that saw a decline of 12 million 
aces (16% of total soybean acreage). Part of the decreased global soybean production in the U.S. was 
taken up by Brazil, the other major soybean exporter.  But, the world’s production of soybeans declined 
in 2007, just at a time when three of the four largest counties in the world—China, India, and Indonesia—
registered very strong growth in their economies.  China imported an incredible 34 mmt of soybeans 
(45% of total world trade), which it used to produce soybean meal for some of its 600 million pigs and its 
large and rapidly growing aquaculture sector, and vegetable oil for its rapidly growing urban population.  
In India and Indonesia, the story focused less on meat and more on vegetable oil.  India, for example, is 
one of the largest users and importers of cooking oils in the world. … Wheat prices also went off the 
charts in 2008 as a consequence of wheat’s feed relationship with corn, and partly because of two factors 
specific to wheat production.  Corn and wheat are both used by the animal-feed industry, and in some 
years, one quarter of the wheat crop is fed directly to animals.  As the cost of using corn for feed rose in 
2007, producers of livestock products looked to other grains.  Since the feed value of wheat is slightly 
higher than corn, it is not surprising that their prices moved in tandem as producers moved among 
markets to find the cheapest rations.  More generally, at a wheat price of 1.1 times that of corn, livestock 
producers are generally indifferent to which of the two grains they use.”  The linkages soon reach the 
breakfast table. Higher corn prices, for example, have made products whose production relies on grain-
based feed, such as milk and eggs, more expensive. 
36 By this we mean the use of food commodities to produce energy for cars and machines.  
37 The long-run income elasticity of energy and oil has been estimated at approximately 1.0 for the non-
OECD countries (Gately and Huntington, 2001).  
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become permanently more expensive in a nontrivial way. In addition, the new link 
between the prices of food commodities and the prices of energy commodities makes 
the prices of the former much more sensitive to the economic cycle and macroeconomic 
policies.  The impact of expansionary macroeconomic policies or of periods of 
aggregate global growth above capacity (overheating) on food commodities prices will 
be larger than it used to.  
 
The main issue here is that with this structural shift in the demand for food 
commodities (corn and oilseeds in particular), other things equal, the rise in their real 
prices will continue well into the future.  OECD (2008) estimates various policy 
scenarios for biofuel production and states that “with full implementation of the recently 
enacted US Energy Independence and Security Act and the currently proposed new EU 
Directive for Renewable Energy, close to 20% of global vegetable oil production and 
more than 13% of world coarse grain output could shift to biofuels production”.
38  Von 
Braun (2008) finds that with the current growth path of biofuel production, i.e. with the 
actual expansion plans for biofuels, oilseeds and corn prices would increase by 18 and 
26 percent, respectively, by 2020.  In contrast, the “business as usual”—that is, without 
biofuels--scenario mentioned above predicted an increase in food commodities prices of 
.26 percent per year or around 5 percent by 2020. 
 
 
The Acceleration in Food Price Increases since mid-2007:  Macroeconomic Factors 
and Policy Reactions in the Developing World 
 
The increase in prices of food commodities—along with other commodities—
accelerated from mid-2007 up until mid-2008 when they began to fall.  Between 
October 2007 and June 2008, for example, they rose by 31 percent: that is, almost a 
quarter of the increase since 2002 took place in about a tenth of the time. Was this 
acceleration driven by the same forces as discussed above?  In other words, did they 
result from the strong nonlinearities or discontinuities that characterize agricultural 
markets when the stocks-to-use ratios are low? Were export restrictions and other 
defensive policies by developing countries a major driver?  What role did 
                                                 
38 The EU directives were revised so their impact needs to be re-estimated.   14
macroeconomic factors -- such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates 




When stocks are low in markets with low demand and supply price elasticities, 
very small changes in demand or supply (or expected demand or supply) can have large 
effects on prices. Clearly during this period there were new incidents that could have 
had strong effects on expected demand and supply and consequently affected prices.  In 
particular, administrative decisions to ban or restrict exports and put bids on purchases 
in some developing countries exacerbated the stress in what were already tight markets.   
 
These undesirable dynamics seems to have impacted in particular the 
international price of rice.
39 In Figure 8 one can observe how the acceleration in the 
price increases of rice coincided with the time in which some key countries introduced 
administrative measures that affected the supply or demand. It apparently started with 
the decision by India’s food authority to place restrictions on rice exports in October 
2007.  In the face of rising world wheat prices, the fear of disruptions in the supply 
chain and the prospect of poor harvests in the country, the Indian government decided to 
guarantee supplies of rice for its public distribution program and placed bans on exports 
of non-basmati varieties of rice, wheat, and wheat flour. In addition, the Indian 
Government restricted wheat imports for the purpose of disease control.
40  
 
The Indian Government’s decision triggered an immediate increase in the price 
of rice in the international markets which went from 300 dollars to 400 dollars per ton.  
The price continued its upward acceleration, and shortly afterwards Vietnam, China, 
Cambodia, Indonesia and Egypt followed suit in imposing restrictions on rice exports. 
Meanwhile, the Philippines (the largest importer of rice in the world) began to place 
bids for imports at any price in April 2008.  At this point, the price of rice rose to 
$850/ton and soon exceeded $1000/ton in May as additional countries placed bids. For 
several weeks, panic reigned to the point that even large US retail food chains put limits 
                                                 
39 See Slayton and Timmer (2008),  Naylor and Falcon (2008). 
40 Slayton and Timmer (2008) were among the first to describe this process.  Also, see Naylor and Falcon 
(2008).   15
on the number of bags of rice consumers could purchase.  These high prices left some of 
the poorest countries (in Sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh) without the ability to 
afford rice imports.  In Africa, the domino effect on other prices did not wait; with rice 
and other imported cereals in short supply, the price of locally grown crops such as 
millet and sorghum rose.
41  
 
Governments that introduced unilateral export restrictions or subsidized imports 
have been criticized because their actions drove already high international food prices 
even higher.  However, these measures were taken in the context of extraordinary 
circumstances prevailing in the world food commodities markets.  As we saw above, a 
significant portion of the rise in the prices of some commodities is due to the rapid 
increase in the production of corn- and oilseed-based biofuels and part of this increase is 
explained by subsidies for biofuels production in the European Union and the United 
States.  Thus, the “moral imperative” cannot be used as a reason to persuade 
governments in developing countries to give up defensive policies if the rich countries 
are not willing to contribute with their share (i.e., by phasing out the policies in support 
to biofuels).  Second, the threat to political and social stability derived from higher food 
prices is all too real for governments to ignore in the name of a “global common good.”  
In the absence of a coordinated response such as international stocks that can be 
deployed to avoid shortages and price spikes, it is understandable that countries decide 
to concentrate on protecting their own. 
 
In addition, as we shall see below, in the last few months the uncertainty 
surrounding the short-term “equilibrium” level of food commodities prices has been 
heightened by the fact that it is not entirely clear to what extent “transitory” 
macroeconomic factors—such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest 
rates—and speculation were affecting the relative prices of all commodities (including 
food commodities).  For instance, to what extent commodities price increases were 
reflecting the relative scarcity of commodities in a very tight market? Or, instead, were 
part of a global inflationary process with commodities taking the lead?   
 
                                                 
41 Naylor and Falcon (2008) and the article by Fleshman (2008).    16
This may be a good place to bring into the discussion the impact of 
macroeconomic factors in explaining the increase in food commodities prices. In 
addition to above trend global growth, there are two other macroeconomic variables 
that—in theory-- can affect commodity prices: exchange rates (in particular, the value 
of the dollar vis-à-vis other currencies) and interest rates (in particular, US interest 
rates).  At the heart of the discussion of the role of macroeconomic factors is whether 
commodities price increases indicate a change in relative prices or whether they are part 
of a monetary phenomenon: that is, global inflation induced by US monetary policy.  
This distinction is important because the correct mix of domestic policy responses will 
be different depending on the case. 
  The Depreciation of the Dollar 
There is evidence that the cycle of the dollar against major currencies is related 
to the cycle of the dollar price of commodities. According to Mundell (2002): “[A] 
casual reading of the statistics suggests that this relationship is quite close. Thus the 
index of non-oil dollar commodities tripled in the 1970s when the dollar was 
depreciating sharply relative to the SDR; it then fell by more than 20 per cent from 1980 
to 1986 when the dollar was soaring; then it rose by 50 per cent from 1986 to 1995 
when the dollar was again depreciating; and it has fallen by 30 per cent since 1995 when 
the dollar has been appreciating. There is therefore a very pronounced association of the 
cycle of the dollar against other major currencies (as measured by the SDR) with the 
cycle of dollar commodity prices.”  
This inverse relationship continued in the 2000s: as the dollar depreciated, 
commodity prices went up. (Figure 9) As shown in Figure 10, however, commodity 
prices rose in all major currencies.  This is an indication that factors other than the 
depreciation of the dollar played a significant role.  However, it is quite possible that the 
depreciation of the dollar may have affected the short-run dynamics of commodity 
prices because of higher demand stemming from the countries whose currencies 
appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar.  
The relationship between exchange rates and the prices of commodities in the 
current international monetary regime—characterized by multiple exchange rates—is 
complex and not fully understood. That is why at present we rely on empirical   17
regularities as a proxy. Available estimates put the elasticity between 0.5 and 
1.0.
42Using the mid-point of these elasticities and the trade-weighted depreciation of the 
dollar, Mitchell (2008) argues that the contribution of dollar weakness to the increase in 
commodity prices between January 2000 and June 2008 could be of the order of 20 
percent (.75 times 26 percent).
43  However, the selection of the mid-point is as good as 
any other.  
 
In a world of multiple exchange rates and in the presence of an unstable dollar, 
should the dollar be the numeraire to measure the “true” opportunity cost of 
commodities? Perhaps not and much less so in the short-run. This might be a good 
reason why governments may resist passing the increase in dollar international prices 
through to domestic prices and instead choose to resort to measures such as price 
controls and export bans.  However, given that commodity prices rose in all major 
currencies, not passing through to domestic prices at least part of the increase may cause 
more problems to countries down the road.  
 
The Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, Interest Rates and the Commodity Price Rise 
Acceleration 
Following the onset of the sub-prime crisis in mid-2007, there was a remarkable 
acceleration in commodity price increases. (Figure 11) Could the two events be linked?  
Frankel ( 2008b) argues that the fact that commodity prices have risen across the board 
calls for some macroeconomic explanation.  For a while, the most popular macro 
explanation was rapid growth in the world economy. However, since mid-2007 (and 
until mid-2008) price rises accelerated even though the global economy has been 
                                                 
42 Gilbert (1989) and Baffes (1997). 
43 We must bear in mind, also, that causality runs both ways.  A productivity boost generated by all-
purpose technology such as the IT “revolution” would result in an appreciation of the currency of the 
leader in the use of such technology and a reduction of commodity prices. On the contrary, an exogenous 
increase in commodity prices will put downward pressure (i.e., towards depreciation) on the currency of 
importing countries.  If part of the increase in commodity prices (food and nonfood) is determined by 
exogenous factors (such as rapid growth in China), this would have put downward pressure on the dollar. 
However, this would have been countered by the rise in prices of commodities where the US is a major 
exporter. But because the US is a net importer of commodities, it suffered a decline in its terms of trade of 
about 7.5 percent between 2002 and 2007.  
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slowing down.
44
  According to Frankel (2006, 2008), Calvo (2008) and others, one of 
the explanations may be the Federal Reserve’s decision to lower interest rates since 
mid-2007.  Lower interest rates increase the demand for or reduce the supply of storable 
commodities through a variety of channels: by decreasing the incentive for pumping oil, 
mining gold, logging forests, culling cattle, etc. today rather than tomorrow; by 
increasing the desire to hold inventories; and, by encouraging investors (or speculators 
if you wish) to shift out of Treasury Bills and into other assets such as foreign 
currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, and  commodities—including food 
commodities. 
The mechanism proposed in Frankel’s model is the following. Commodity 
prices are determined by a number of factors including investors’ asset portfolio 
decisions. The decision whether to hold a commodity for another period (on the ground, 
in the trees or in the form of inventories) or to sell it at today’s price, deposit the 
proceeds and earn interest, depends on the interest rate and the expectations about prices 
in the future. Thus, through arbitrage conditions, the relative price of a commodity (vis-
a-vis its long-term equilibrium) is inversely related to the real interest rate.  The 
mechanism at play is the following. When interest rates are low—such as in the present 
scenario-- money flows out of interest-bearing instruments and into foreign currencies, 
emerging market stocks, other securities, and  commodities—including food 
commodities.  This portfolio shift drives the prices of these assets higher and higher 
until they reach a level where people perceive that they lie “sufficiently” above their 
future long-run equilibrium level.  Monetary policy causes real commodity prices to 
rise initially (they increase more than proportionately than the increase in money 
supply, for example) because other prices are “sticky” (or, in other words, they rise at a 
slower speed).  Because of the different speeds of price adjustments and arbitrage 
conditions regarding price expectations and interest rates, commodity prices (and other 
the prices of other assets) overshoot in real (and often in monetary) terms.
45 
 
                                                 
44 The IMF reduced predicted growth rates for the world in 2008 from 5.2 percent in July 2007 to 4.1 
percent in January 2008 (IMF World Economic Outlook Updates for July 2007 and January 2008). The 
WEO Update for July 2008 has kept the 4.1 percent projection for world output growth.. 
45 There has been a lot of debate about whether speculation contributed to the acceleration of commodity 
prices.  If one considers “speculation” any decision that is based on the expectations of the behavior of 
prices in the future, the process described above could be included as part of speculative activities.    19
Frankel (2006) provides econometric evidence in support of the inverse 
relationship between commodity prices and real interest rates in the US dating back to 
the 1950s which is generally robust.
46 Casual observation (Figures 11 and 12) shows 
that the decisions to lower interest rates by the Federal Reserve in mid-2007 were 
followed by an acceleration in the price increases.  In Frankel’s own words: “…events 
since August 2007 provide a further data point. As economic growth has slowed 
sharply, both in the US and globally, the Fed has reduced interest rates, both nominal 
and real. Firms and investors have responded by shifting into commodities, not out. 
This is why commodity prices have resumed their upward march over the last six 
months, rather than reversing it.”
47  One could also add that the relatively rapid fall in 
all commodity prices between July and August 2008 contributes to yet another data 
point in the theory by giving more credibility to the notion that there was 
“overshooting” in the behavior of the prices of commodities.
 48 Spot prices for food (and 
practically all) commodities fluctuated sharply since January 2008.  In the case of food 
commodities, for example, the price of wheat went from $370 to $440 from January to 
March to then fall to $329 in May and the price of rice went from $394 in January to 
$1009 in May and dropped to $799 in July and $737 in August.  Similarly, the price of 
corn started at a level of $207 in January, it peaked in June at $287 (a 39% increase) and 




The role of expansionary monetary policies in explaining rising commodity 
prices in the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis has also been suggested by the Latin 
American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (CLAAF).
50 According to the 
Committee, “…[W]hile a monetary explanation focuses essentially on absolute price 
changes, it may also accommodate the possibility of a transitory increase in relative 
                                                 
46 Frankel (2006) 
47 Frankel (2008b). 
48 Even if it is demonstrated that the Federal Reserve’s policies contributed to price rise acceleration, this 
should not be interpreted as a criticism to these policies. Given the all too real prospects of a systemic 
financial meltdown, the Fed was probably right in lowering interest rates even at the risk of fueling 
inflation. 
49 Data is from the IMF Primary Commodities Database. Prices are in US$ per metric tonne. For wheat, 
prices are for Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico. For rice, prices are 
for Rice, 5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote. Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 
Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tonne. Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago 
Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per metric tonne.  
50 CLAAF (2008).    20
prices. More precisely, an increase in inflation, in its initial stages, tends to manifest 
itself as a non uniform process. In particular, commodity prices react faster than wages 
and prices of domestically produced services. Therefore, in the short run, a rise in the 
rate of inflation will bring about an increase in the relative price of commodities vis-à-
vis less flexible prices. It is worth noting that the monetary explanation implies that, in 
the long run, there will be no major relative price change. Thus, the entire episode might 
resemble a price bubble. Furthermore, the increase in commodity prices becomes a 
leading indicator of future generalized inflation.”
51 This process relies entirely on the 
assumption that prices adjust at different speeds, an assumption that empirical evidence 
suggests it is valid. 
 
The importance of expansionary monetary policy as a cause of the acceleration 
of the price increases has been dismissed because if that were the case, one would 
observe an increase in stocks of commodities—including food commodities-- and 
available evidence does not seem to show this.
52 However, in the case of certain 
commodities such as oil or metals, stocks can be accumulated in “invisible” ways: by 
drilling or mining less. In the case of agricultural commodities, this option does not 
really exist because one cannot accumulate them by simply not harvesting a crop.  But, 
as Calvo (2008) has argued, in the face of highly inelastic demand, the desired level of 
stocks may increase, but given the short run inelastic nature of supply, this may express 
itself by rising prices rather than higher stocks. (Note, by the way, that government 
interventions to restrict exports and expand subsidies have contributed to the inelasticity 
of supply and demand). Furthermore, it is probably naïve to think that stocks 
accumulated by sovereign governments are public knowledge in full.
53 Finally, because 
of the recently created link between food commodities and fossil fuels  through the 
biofuels nexus, part of the impact of lower interest rates on food commodities prices 
                                                 
51 Also, see Rojas-Suarez (2008). 
52 See, for example, Krugman (2008).  
53 In addition, in the case of agricultural commodities in particular, accumulation of stocks may be 
“invisible” because it is done by millions of consumers buying additional amounts which although small 
individually, can add up and put upward pressure on prices.  If, for example, if we take half of the 
population of India, China, Indonesia and Bangladesh (a total of 1,428,658,500 persons, WEO data) and 
assume an increase in the amount of rice bought by consumers of 10 kilos per year per person, this would 
result in an increase in demand in the order of 14,286,585,000 kilos or 14,286,585 tons. With world rice 
production at 430.72 million tons in 2008 (USDA) this represents 3.3% of world production or 5% of the 
production in these four countries (which in 2008/2009 is estimated  at 292 million tons, USDA). In 
addition, export restrictions imposed by governments are tantamount to a form of speculation because 
they also restrict supply available in world markets.    21
may be indirect (that is, there is no need to observe an accumulation of their 
inventories).
 54  
 
One important aspect to bear in mind is that the explanations of the acceleration 
in commodity price increases based on fundamentals vs. monetary factors, though 
clearly distinct, are not mutually exclusive. The explanation which emphasizes the 
workings of physical demand and supply for commodities, considers inflation a 
consequence of these persistent relative price changes.  In contrast, for the monetary 
explanation, the increase in the relative price of commodities is partly endogenous: a 
consequence of expansionary monetary policy. But both may be and are likely to have 
been at play. This is an area that deserves further research.  
The reason why it is of such importance to know to what extent the price rise 
acceleration since mid-2007 is determined by fundamentals or is a monetary 
phenomenon is because the appropriate policy response differs depending on the case. If 
price increases are a reflection of a “true” change in their relative price, governments 
should allow the increase to be reflected in domestic prices. To the extent that the price 
changes are the result of global inflationary pressures associated with lower US interest 
rates it might be sensible policy for governments to try to partially decouple domestic 
prices from the behavior of international prices.  However, as we will discuss in more 
detail below, this response should not be overdone.  In addition to the harm done to 
others, not allowing higher international prices to be passed through to domestic prices 
may also result in serious distortions in producers and consumers’ response. It can also 
defer and worsen inflationary pressures, exacerbate fiscal imbalances and channel large 
amounts of scarce government resources to the non-poor.
55 
                                                 
54 However, correlation is not proof of causality.  The spike in prices could also be explained by the 
nonlinearities present in tight commodity markets which were subject to additional shocks such as the 
administrative decisions mentioned above (export bans, export taxes, etc.). And the recent fall could be 
explained by the expected downward pressure on prices resulting from a slowdown in global growth. In 
addition, the inverse relation between commodity prices and interest rates does not always hold 
empirically.  
55 Another factor which has been mentioned to explain the acceleration in commodity price increases 
since mid-2007 is speculation in financial markets and the rise in the participation of index funds.  So far, 
the evidence does not seem to support the idea that they have played a fundamental role in explaining the 
rise; they have contributed to higher volatility in the prices though.    22
2. The Impact of Rising Food Prices on Inflation and Poverty  
 
The rapid increase in food commodities prices is having a significant impact on 
poverty reduction and developing countries’ macroeconomic conditions. Rising food 
prices increase poverty for millions of poor (and near-poor) people throughout the 
developing word. If high food prices persist, there could be irreversible damage to the 
human capital of the poor and a significant reversal in the progress made towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The damage to human capital, if large 
and persistent enough, could in turn have a negative impact on long-term growth 
particularly in the poorest countries.  
 
Rising food prices, however, not only cause poverty to go up. They also reduce 
poverty for millions of poor farmers. However, this should not be a source of comfort. 
While it is important to point out that some of the poor gain from higher food prices, 
netting the impact is not the right approach: one of the worst types of redistribution is 
one in which some of the poor benefit at the expense of others who are also poor. Food 
insecurity is very painful to the poor who are hurt by higher food prices. The thousands 
of testimonials gathered in the World Bank’s volume Voices of the Poor portray the 
sense of deprivation that lack of food brings to the poor. In country after country, the 
poor distinguish themselves from the non-poor because there is hunger in their 
households.
56 The poor forego meals on a regular basis and eat nutritionally inadequate 
diets. For the poor lack of access to food means distress at being unable to feed their 
children, anxiety from not knowing where the next meal will come from, and insecurity 
from not being able to work at full potential because of weakness and disease. 
 
Rising food commodities prices pose significant macroeconomic challenges and 
policy dilemmas to developing countries. Both commodity exporters and commodity 
importers
57  must grapple with inflationary pressures.  And both face the dilemma of 
how much of the food commodities world price increases should be passed through to 
domestic consumers. 
 
                                                 
56 Narayan et al. (2000).  
57 The terms “commodity exporters (importers)” actually refer to net commodity exporters (importers): 
i.e., those countries for which the revenues generated by commodity exports exceed (are below) the 
amount paid for commodity imports.   23
High food prices are a source of social unrest and many countries have faced 
food protests and riots, some of them quite violent (Figure 13). Persistent high food 
prices could also become a contributing factor to new conflicts or relapses in post-
conflict countries.  The more vulnerable cases are likely to be those in which food 
production or marketing, or the pain of higher food prices, is concentrated in certain 
geographic areas and/or in certain ethnic or religious groups.
58 High food prices can also 
exacerbate the devastating consequences of conflict by undermining access to food for 
the poor and vulnerable. And as the World Food Program has demonstrated, they have 
created severe budgetary difficulties for food aid programs and made planning for food 
relief excruciatingly difficult.  
 
Faced with falling living standards, inflationary pressures, food insecurity and 
the threat (or reality) of social unrest, governments in developing countries have been 
resorting to measures that have exacerbated the upward pressure on world food 
commodities prices and weakened a rules-based international trading system. Soaring 
food commodities prices have pushed governments to intervene in markets sometimes 
in often inefficient and beggar-thy-neighbor ways. To cope with their repercussions, 
governments are using price controls, general (as opposed to targeted) subsidies and 
export restrictions or outright bans; and, net importers of food are debating whether they 
should re-instate agricultural support policies and trade barriers eliminated during the 
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s in order to become more self-
reliant in food production.  This process has significantly undermined a rules-based 
trading system. Even the recent collapse of the Doha Trade Round negotiations was due 
in part to the fall-out of high food prices. As food security returns to the political 
agenda, many developing countries want to protect their agricultural sector from surges 
in external competition through special safeguards, subsidies or trade barriers. As long 
as the multilateral system does not address how to eliminate the policy-induced sources 
of higher food prices (such as government support for corn- and oilseeds-based biofuels 
production on the part of rich countries) and reduce price fluctuations associated with 
idiosyncratic shocks or global inflationary pressures, it should come as no surprise that 
                                                 
58 Historians have documented how food conflicts and riots arise in situations where a group with enough 
purchasing power can attract food from regions which grow it even if it is at the expense of those with 
weak or lost purchasing power who are left without adequate access to food (Tilly,1983; Tilly, 1975)  
Current research, however, has focused on conflict as a cause of food insecurity (Nafziger, Stewart and 
Väyrynen, 2000;  Stewart, Fitzgerald and Associates, 2001).   24
developing countries will choose to protect their own interests even if it is at the 
expense of others. 
 
 
Rising Food Prices and Inflation 
 
Rising food commodities prices pose significant macroeconomic challenges and 
policy dilemmas to developing countries. This is particularly so because it is not just 
food commodities which have been rising in price; all commodities have, including 
energy prices. Commodity exporters
59 have been experiencing a boom and fiscal 
revenues have risen.  However, the number of countries in this category is smaller than 
those hurt by higher commodity prices.  As shown in Figure 14, the change in terms of 
trade for food and fuel combined is positive for 29 countries and negative for 87.  
Moreover, the question remains whether countries that benefit from higher food and 
fuel prices have been able to transform the windfall into sustainable growth or continue 
to be vulnerable to the “natural resource curse.”
60 As for commodity importers, until 
mid-2007 they were partially insulated from the negative effect of rising world 
commodity prices because rapid global economic growth translated into higher exports, 
remittances and tourism. This changed with the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis in 
the United States.  Since then global economic growth has slowed down and commodity 
price increases accelerated, at least for a while.
61 As a result commodity importers faced 
significant negative terms of trade shocks and pressure on their fiscal stance.   
 
One thing that commodity exporters and commodity importers have in common 
is that both must grapple with inflationary pressures. As we can see in Figure15 food 
price inflation has been on the rise in developing countries.  What is the most adequate 
response to cope with inflationary pressures stemming from higher world food and fuel 
prices?  The answer depends on the extent to which the increase in world prices is a real 
or a “monetary” phenomenon. If the increase were a “pure” change in the real price of 
                                                 
59 The terms “commodity exporters (importers)” actually refer to net commodity exporters (importers): 
i.e., those countries for which the revenues generated by commodity exports exceed (are below) the 
amount paid for commodity imports. 
60 For example, if the boom resulted in a large appreciation of their currencies eroding the 
competitiveness of their manufacturing and agricultural sectors and if the government spent the windfall 
as if it was permanent, countries could face serious difficulties when commodity prices fall.  For decades 
this was the pattern for many countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
61 As we saw in the previous section, these two events may be related because of the inflationary 
pressures unleashed by the lowering of US interest rates.   25
food commodities, central banks have two options: to accommodate the price increases 
as a one-time spike in the rate of inflation or to suppress it through tight monetary 
policy.  The former is preferable because it would avoid the negative impact that the 
latter has on economic activity.  However, central banks that allow inflation to rise (in 
particular, if they allow it to exceed the set inflation targets) are putting their hard-won 
credibility at risk and this risk has to be weighed against the costs of tight monetary 
policy in terms of foregone output.  Also, in countries in which wage and price 
indexation is widespread, it will be hard to prevent the initial increase in inflation from 
becoming entrenched.   
 
Wage and price indexation, however, is much less frequent today than it was in 
the past.  Given that fulfilling the inflation targets may mean that nonfood (with the 
exception of other commodities) prices must fall in nominal terms, some degree of 
accommodation might be desirable.
 62  Without it significant losses in economic activity 
are likely and this, in turn, would exacerbate the impact on poverty that food price 
increases produce directly. In addition, the recessionary impact of tight monetary policy 
would reduce the fiscal resources available to compensate the poor through targeted 
safety nets.  
 
Thus, a prudent accommodation of the price increase whenever feasible is the 
best course of action.  One way to make the transitory nature of the accommodation 
credible might be for the central banks and ministries of finance to openly acknowledge 
that this will be the course of action and negotiate some form of “pact” with the 
business sector, labor unions and other groups’ representatives to avoid inflationary 
dynamics from unraveling.
63  But if the signals are that inflationary dynamics are taking 
hold (for example, if nominal wages are increased by similar amounts as the general 
price increases), central banks will have to tighten monetary policy to stop them. An 
agreement with the IMF in which its task is to monitor whether monetary authorities 
and ministries of finance are treating the accommodation of the rise in inflation as 
temporary could be a way to strengthen the credibility of central banks and preclude 
inflationary expectations from becoming entrenched.  
                                                 
62 Even the IMF (2008) has recognized that inflation targets might have to be missed in order to avoid an 
excessive reduction in output or output growth. Also, see Dervis (2008). 
63 There are examples of successful wage-price “pacts.” For example, Israel and Mexico implemented 
successful incomes policies in the 1980s.    26
 
For net importers, moreover, access to external resources from the IMF or other 
sources can allow them to adjust more gradually to the negative impact caused by 
higher food (and other) commodities prices on their balance of payments.  External 
financing will help countries to adjust gradually to the new adverse circumstances but 
cannot be available to avoid them altogether.  If this external financing is complemented 
with resources and policies to increase the levels of productivity and competitiveness, 
the adaptation of these countries to a negative environment could be turned into an 
opportunity. 
 
A prudent accommodation of the food commodities price increase is the most 
desirable course of action if the latter represents a “permanent” change in the relative 
value of food (and other) commodities. To the extent that food commodities price 
increases are a monetary phenomenon, however, the appropriate policy response might 
be different.  Insulating domestic prices from external inflationary pressures is correct. 
Even more so if the monetary commodity price cycle is likely to be subject to 
overshooting as happened in the period from mid-2007 to June 2008. One way to do 
this is to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate.  This would imply that food 
commodities prices (and, therefore, food prices) in the domestic currency would rise 
more slowly.  As a result, real incomes would not suffer or not suffer as much as the 
increase in the international food commodities prices would imply.  
 
In the countries that are net exporters of commodities, a nominal (and real) 
appreciation of the domestic currency would be a natural by-product of the rise in 
revenues in foreign exchange resulting from the commodity boom.  However, in the 
countries that are net importers of commodities this may not be an option given the 
impact that higher commodity prices have on their current accounts.  If the governments 
in these countries want to see an appreciation of their currency, they will need to raise 
interest rates and as a result face a slowdown in their economic activity.  This effect can 
be mitigated if countries have access to external funds. One natural candidate to provide 
these funds is the IMF.   
 
However, relying mainly on a macroeconomic price such as the exchange rate 
may not be the best course of action. An exchange rate appreciation has its costs   27
because it affects all tradable goods.  By lowering the domestic price of tradables, it 
creates disincentives to exporters and hurts import-competing sectors in the economy.  
An appreciation which is not driven by higher domestic productivity, moreover, can 
slowdown growth.  And if economic growth falls, so do fiscal revenues thereby 
exacerbating macroeconomic imbalances. Thus, if the increase in world commodity 
prices is partially a monetary phenomenon, implementing policies that are targeted to 
contain domestic price increases in specific markets may be appropriate.   
 
A sensible alternative would be to use a combination of an appreciation of the 
exchange rate with policies targeted to specific markets to contain the domestic price 
increases of, in particular, food commodities.  Among the targeted policies there are 
those which make use of controls such as price controls and export bans and those 
which use fiscal policy to affect prices such as changes in general price subsidies, 
export taxes, indirect taxes and import tariffs.  In general, on efficiency grounds, the 
latter are preferable to the direct controls.  The choice of which specific targeted 
policies to use should be based on “common sense” criteria.  For example, governments 
should choose those price policy interventions which are more easily reversed (that is, 
they do not become hijacked by special interest groups), least distortionary, least 
regressive, more consistent with a rules-based trading system, simple to implement from 
an administrative point of view and do not cause unsustainable fiscal imbalance.
 64 
 
How have countries been responding? The food price inflation data indicate that 
there has been some degree of accommodation. (Figure 15)  There is also evidence that 
currencies from many developing countries have appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar. But a 
large number of governments have been implementing targeted measures to contain 
prices for specific food commodities.  More than 80 developing countries for which 
data is available have put in place at least one of the following: reduced import tariffs, 
reduced indirect taxes, relaxed import restrictions, price controls, general consumer 
subsidies, export bans, export restrictions and export taxes. (Figure 16) 
 
                                                 
64 Unfortunately, the information was codified in a way that does not distinguish between the use of 
controls vs. fiscal policy.  In addition, there is no mention whether these measures were introduced as 
explicitly temporary or not.   28
With the exception of import-liberalizing policies, the rest has elicited quite a bit 
of criticism from multilateral institutions.   But targeted policies may be an appropriate 
response if price increases in world market are part of an inflationary process which 
originated in lower interest rates in the United States.
  As we saw in the previous 
section, there are reasons to believe that the recent acceleration in food commodities 
prices may be part of a global inflationary process. If this is true, part of the increase in 
food commodities prices is not a change in their “real” relative price (or opportunity 
cost) and governments from developing countries may be right in applying targeted 
measures to insulate domestic food prices from their behavior in international markets. 
 
It is important to remember, however, that part of the increase in world food 
commodities prices is real and, thus, should be passed through to domestic prices. 
Policy interventions that attempt to retard the transmission of the change in international 
commodity prices to the domestic markets in full will be self-defeating because 
domestic producers and consumers will not adjust to the new price signals. Also, these 
measures can be very onerous from the fiscal point of view and inequitable in terms of 
the use of scarce government resources because, for instance, the benefits of many 
general subsidies largely accrue to the nonpoor. Hence, measures targeted to contain 
prices for specific food items should be applied in moderation and phased out when no 
longer necessary.  The problem is that once implemented, new vested interests are born 
and the temporary nature of the interventions can go down the drain.  The use of “pacts” 
or agreements with the business sector, labor unions and other representative groups as 
the ones mentioned above might we a way to avoid this. 
 
The use of policy interventions that put a wedge between domestic and 
international prices exacerbates the price pressures in world markets for the affected 
commodities. Many of these unilateral decisions restrict the flow of food commodities 
in the international markets and, therefore, weakened a rules-based trading system. 
Without a credible multilateral solution to large food price fluctuations, however, it is 
not surprising that countries pursue what is perceived as best for them even if the rest of 
the world is worse off as a result.  A rules-based trading system should include 
safeguards and mechanisms which would make the protection of domestic consumers 
and producers from large—and recurrent-- food commodities price fluctuations (in   29
either direction) orderly and legitimate.  One such mechanism is the creation of an 
international stock. 
 
Rising Food Prices and Poverty 
 
Until recently, analysts and policymakers used to be concerned that world food 
commodity prices were kept artificially low by agricultural support policies in advanced 
countries, thereby hurting millions of poor farmers in the developing world.
65  Now, the 
concern is the opposite. With food prices sharply up, multilateral organizations and 
governments fear that the livelihoods of millions of poor consumers throughout the 
world have been put at risk.
66   
 
How can higher food prices be good and harmful to the poor at the same time? 
The answer is simple: the poor include both net buyers and net sellers of food in 
significant proportions.  Small poor farmers benefit from higher food prices.  However, 
the poor in urban areas and those in rural areas with little or no access to land are hurt, 
and hurt badly, when food prices increase.  This contradictory impact of food prices on 
the poor has been called the “food price dilemma.”
67  This dilemma has been the source 
of a futile debate regarding when the poor are better off: when food prices go up or 
when they go down?  Rather than trying to measure and base the policy response on the 
net impact of higher (lower) food prices on poverty, policymakers should simply accept 
the unavoidable fact that if food prices rise (fall) poor net buyers (net sellers) will need 
help and rejoice in the fact that poor net sellers (net buyers) will be better off.  In either 
case, safety net programs will have to be expanded in coverage and size to compensate 
the group of the poor who get hurt. In addition, when food commodities prices increase, 
                                                 
65 See, for example, Cline (2003), Hoekman and Olarreaga (2007).  
66 Although domestic food prices have not risen as rapidly as international prices, IMF (2008) estimates 
find that “the median 12-month rate of food price inflation for a sample of 120 non-OECD countries rose 
from 10 percent at end-2007 to 12 percent at end-March 2008, almost twice the median food price 
inflation rate of 2006.” (p.18). Similarly, World Bank (2008b) reports food inflation 2007/2008 for a 
group of countries and finds that food inflation rose by around 20% in Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and 
Costa Rica and reached a staggering 30% in countries like Kyrgyz Republic and Sri Lanka. 
67 Timmer, Falcon and Pearson (1983), Chapter 1. This dilemma has been analyzed empirically for a 
number of countries.  See, for example, Ackah and Appleton (2007); Barrett and Dorosh (1996); Deaton 
(1989); Lustig (1986); Mellor (1978); Pinstrup-Andersen (1987); Ravallion and van de Walle (1991); 
Ravallion (1990); Trairatvorakul (1984).   30
there is an opportunity to help poor net sellers translate this windfall into a more long-
term improvement in living standards. 
 
As a general proposition, the impact on poverty generated by an increase in the 
price of food will depend on: i. the relative importance of different food commodities in 
the production set and consumption basket of different households and the difference 
between the two
68; ii. the magnitude of the relative price change; and, iii. the degree to 
which households are compensated for the price shocks by changes in their income (i.e., 
by the indirect effect on wages and employment originated by the price change). 
69  
Evidence suggests that: the poor spend between 60 and 80 percent of their income on 
food on average; the increase in domestic food price has been significant, and the 
positive effects on wages take time. 
 
This is not the place to provide a comprehensive survey of the vast literature 
(dating at least as far back as the 1970s) of the impact of changes of food prices on 
poverty.  The relationship has been analyzed using different methods ranging from 
partial to general equilibrium frameworks and an assortment of econometric techniques.  
For example, Deaton (1989) using a non-parametric method showed that an increase in 
the price of rice in Thailand benefits all households in the rural areas including the poor 
but urban households, including the poor, are made worse off.
70  There are no direct 
estimates of the overall impact on poverty in this article, though.  Ravallion and Van der 
Walle (1991) show that the impact of an increase in the price of rice in Indonesia on 
poverty is quite sensitive to the selection of the poverty measurement and the poverty 
line.
71 They find that a price increase reduces the headcount ratio at a particular poverty 
line but raises it at lower poverty lines reflecting the fact that the poorest of the poor are 
net consumers of rice and that net producers are closer to the initial poverty line. When 
                                                 
68 For poor farmers, the difference is often positive indicating that they benefit from a price increase. In 
contrast, poor urban households or landless agricultural workers are net consumers of food commodities 
and get hurt by an increase in their price. 
69 To estimate the latter, one must be able to estimate the spillover effects; this has been done using multi-
sectoral and full-fledged computable general equilibrium models. Some CGEs are Walrasian, that is, all 
markets clear via prices and there is no unemployment.  Others are more heterodox: they assume flexible 
prices in some markets but in others prices are determined as a mark-up above costs and total 
employment is endogenously determined by the level of aggregate demand. 
70 Deaton does not seem to see a problem with this outcome because there are fewer urban households, 
the urban poor spend a small fraction of their budget on rice and the urban households’ income is much 
higher than rural household income 
71 They also show that and that the impact is not symmetric: that is, the elasticity of poverty with respect 
to a decrease in the price is different from the elasticity with respect to an increase in the price.   31
they use distributionally sensitive measures (such as the FGT index), an increase in the 
price of rice has unambiguous negative effects on poverty (i.e., the index goes up) for 
all poverty lines and all distributionally sensitive measures. Using the Intensity of 
Consumption and Intensity of Production Coefficients, Lustig (1986) finds that an 
increase in the price of corn in Mexico has a negative impact on the incomes of the poor 
if both rural and urban poor are combined but if one disaggregates poor net buyers from 
poor net sellers, the former experience a negative but small effect while the latter 
experience a large positive effect which translates in an improvement in their diets.  As 
in the case of Deaton, no overall measure of poverty is provided. 
 
Overall, existing empirical evidence shows that an increase in food prices will 
make many of the already poor worse off and make some of the near poor (households 
with incomes just above the poverty line) poor.  This, however, does not always 
translate into an increase in aggregate poverty (in, for example, the headcount ratio) 
because higher food prices also make part of the poor better off.  But, there is a 
consensus that—at least in the short-run-- high food prices are bad for the poor because 
most of the poorest of the poor are net food buyers, even in rural areas and even where 
agriculture is the dominant activity
72  That is, in the majority of countries, the net effect 
will be a higher poverty rate.  However, as argued above, the net effect may not be the 
relevant indicator when deciding on the policy response. Even in countries where the 
net effect is a reduction in poverty, poor net buyers should have access to a broadened 
safety net system. 
 
Furthermore, even if in the short-run higher food prices hurt more poor 
households than benefit them, could it be that in the medium-term higher incomes to net 
sellers induce higher incomes for net buyers through multiplier effects between 
agricultural and non farm incomes in rural areas? There is a large body of evidence that 
correlates higher agricultural incomes with higher non farm activity and incomes
73; in 
general, studies show that the virtuous circle might take considerable time to manifest 
                                                 
72 Ravallion (1989); Seshan and Umali-Deininger (2007); Byerlee, Myers and Jayne (2006); 
Christiaensen and Demery (2007); Jayne, Yamano, Nyoto, and Awuor (2001); Coady et al. (2008); Warr 
2005. Simulations of the impact of the reduction of agricultural support policies in rich countries also 
show that in many countries first round effects of a price increase could hurt the poorest (Hoekman and 
Olarreaga, 2007). 
73 For a survey see Haggblade, Hazel and Dorosh, 2007.    32
itself.
74 In the short-run, the negative impact on the majority of poor households’ 
welfare is inevitable. In the case of the poor, the short-run effect is particularly 
important because the damage to health, nutrition and cognitive development might be 
irreversible.  
 
What has been the impact of the recent increases in food prices on poverty? 
Table 6 presents a summary of recent studies.  As one can observe, they use different 
methods, poverty lines and assumptions about price increases, pass-through to domestic 
prices, substitution effects, and wage (and other indirect income) effects. Also, some 
include net sellers while others don’t.  However, in spite of all these differences, on 
average, the evidence finds that in the majority of countries, higher food commodities 
prices increase poverty for practically all the food commodities.  
 
The orders of magnitude of the estimated short-term impact of higher food 
prices on poverty are significant. Ivanic and Martin (2008) show that about 105 million 
people in the least developed countries have been added to the world’s poor since 2005 
because of rising food prices.  This is equivalent to about 10 percent of the people living 
with less than a dollar a day and, according to the authors, and “close to seven lost years 
of progress in poverty reduction” (p.17). Even middle-income Latin America has not 
remained impervious: Robles et al.( 2008) estimate that the increase in world food 
prices between January 2006 and March 2008 resulted in an increase of 4.3 percentage 
points in the headcount ratio or 21  million additional poor individuals.
75 CEPAL 
(2008)—the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean-- 
estimates that the ranks of the extremely poor and the moderately poor increased by 10 
million each. The Asian Development Bank (2008) suggests that a 20% increase in food 
prices would raise the number of poor individuals by 5.65 and 14.67 million in 
Philippines and Pakistan, respectively.
76  
 
It is important to point out that these estimates on the poverty impact of higher 
food prices do not take into account the positive effect that higher food commodities 
                                                 
74 In the case of Bangladesh, for example, Ravallion (1989) suggests that secondary effects of rice price 
increases through labor markets could lead to higher incomes for the poorest after three to four years.  
75 Regional numbers for Latin America are own calculations based on Robles et al. (2008) country-by-
country estimations for net increase in poverty. 
75  
76 For a more extreme scenario of 30% increase in food prices, the number of poor people increases by 
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prices has had on economic growth in net exporting countries.  In these countries, the 
net effect of the commodity boom may well be a reduction in poverty.  At present none 
of the estimates account for this impact.
77  Since net exporters are fewer and richer than 
the net importers, the overall impact on poverty in low-income countries may not 
change much even if the commodity boom-driven growth dividend for net exporters is 
taken into account.   
 
Throughout the developing world, poor net buyers will be adversely affected by 
higher food prices and net buyers living just above the poverty line are likely to become 
poor.  Are developing countries ready to compensate these groups for their loss in 
purchasing power? In particular, do safety net programs exist and can they be easily 
expanded to incorporate the “new” poor?  Do governments have the fiscal space to 
accommodate the additional resources needed to fund the safety net? Unfortunately, 19 
(out of 49) low-income and 49 (out of 95) middle-income countries do not have safety 
net programs.  Figure 21 presents the safety net programs available in low and middle-
income countries by category: cash transfers, food for work, food ration/stamp and 
school feeding programs. Given the characteristic of the adverse shock—i.e., an 
increase in the price of a good that takes up a substantial portion of the poor person’s 
budget—the most adequate safety net is to compensate the affected population for their 
loss in purchasing power in cash.  Although cash transfers programs (conditional and 
unconditional) are increasingly more common, they are still not pervasive. According to 
Figure 21 there are 16 (out of 49) low-income and 37 (out of 95) middle-income 
countries that have cash transfers programs.  School feeding programs are a bit more 
common in low-income countries that cash transfers programs but still only 24 of low-
income countries have such programs.  While they will not compensate the poor for the 
loss of purchasing power associated with higher food prices, school feeding programs 
can insulate (at least in part) the children of poor households from suffering a cut in 
their food intake as a result of higher food prices.   
 
In addition to the fact that there are many low- and middle-income countries 
which do not have safety net programs to help the poor who get hurt by higher food 
prices, those which do may have very limited coverage.  In the case of Latin America 
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and the Caribbean, for example, the coverage of cash transfer programs exceeds 25 
percent of the population living in poverty in 8 out of 26 countries: Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama. The poorest countries in the 
region either do not have programs or have them in a very limited scale.   
 
Furthermore, most of these programs do not have a mechanism to incorporate 
the “new” poor or increase the size of the benefit in the face of adverse shocks as part of 
their design.  Some governments (Brazil and Mexico, for example) have increased the 
amount of the transfer to compensate for the loss in its purchasing power. However, the 
programs have not incorporated as beneficiaries those who became poor as a result of 
the food price increase.  So far it is not clear how many of the countries which have 
cash transfers programs increased the amount of the transfer and incorporated the “new” 
poor into the program (or implemented a complementary program).   
 
In sum, the existing safety net system in developing countries leaves much to be 
desired. In too many countries it is either inexistent or small; and, even in the countries 
in which cash transfers programs are large and effective in addressing chronic poverty, 
they are not designed to respond to shocks.  This means that the majority of the poor 
who have been hurt or those who have become poor as a result of higher food prices are 
not being protected from the impact of higher food prices on their living standards.  In 
the cases in which these programs have been expanded, this was done as an ad hoc 
measure implemented many months (or even years) after food price increases appeared 
in the scene. 
 
Low-income countries for whom higher commodity prices represent a negative 
terms of trade shock may not have the fiscal space to finance an expansion let alone 
launch a new safety net programs.  There is no available data in the public domain as to 
how many countries may be in such position.
78  These countries are candidates for 
receiving multilateral support in the form of grants or concessional loans whose 
destination should be to fund the safety net programs to cope with rising food prices. 
The World Bank, for example, has already approved more than 120 million dollars of 
grants primarily (from its Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund funded from Bank 
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there is no indication how many countries may need it to expand or implement a safety net.   35
surplus) to bolster the safety net system in 14 low-income countries and an additional 
400 million dollars is in the pipeline. 
 
Should the overriding policy recommendation be to implement cash transfer 
programs as quickly and as in many countries as possible? The answer is yes. These 
programs are key to help “pure” and net buyers of food cope with rising food prices, but 
as long as they have an “insurance” component: that is, as long as cash transfer 
programs are able to incorporate the “new” poor and adjust their transfers fast enough.  
As mentioned these programs where they exist have not been designed with an 
“insurance” component in mind.  It will be necessary to analyze whether cash transfer 
programs can be adapted to incorporate an “insurance” component and what does this 
imply in terms of their institutional design and implementation. 
 
Are there other measures that can be implemented to help poor consumers cope 
with rising food prices? De Janvry and Sadoulet (2008) suggest that measures geared to 
increase access to land and improve the productivity of subsistence and below-
subsistence farmers can be a more appropriate intervention particularly in the case of 
poor countries. In low-income countries between 80 and 90 percent of the poor live in 
rural areas and between two thirds and three fourths of them have access to a plot of 
land. However, even if they home produce some of the food they consume, most of 
them are net buyers of food and are hurt by higher food prices.  If this group could have 
more access to land and/or increase the productivity of the land they already have, one 
could achieve two goals simultaneously. First, one could reduce the impact of higher 
food prices on the rural poor by lowering the amount that must be purchased by them in 
the market and converting those with sufficient assets into self-sufficient farmers or 
even marginal net sellers. Second, one could begin to address the supply-side 
constraints on food commodity production mentioned in Section 1 at the lower end of 
the spectrum.  De Janvry and Sadoulet recommend that policy measures should increase 
the access to:  improved seeds and fertilizers for crops, and to small animals; credit to 
purchase inputs; more land; and, technical assistance.  
 
We have seen that higher food prices makes large numbers of the already poor 
poorer and some of the nonpoor poor. But could this impact on poverty translate into 
lower long-run economic growth?  In low-income countries with little or no agricultural   36
potential if food becomes “permanently” more expensive, we could start to witness the 
process described by Nobel Prize Laureate Robert Fogel in reverse.
79  Fogel 
demonstrated that–by increasing the amount of energy available for work and the 
human efficiency in transforming the dietary energy due, for example, to a lower 
incidence of disease-- improvements in the UK’s diet could account for as much as 30 
percent of the growth between 1790 and 1980.
80 By the same token, if higher food 
prices lead increasing numbers of people in poor countries to downgrade their diet (in 
quantity and quality) for a sustainable period, long-run economic growth in those 
countries would fall.  This, in turn, would cause progress on the poverty front to slow 
down in the long-run even further.  
 
The opposite could happen in low-income countries with large numbers of 
marginal net sellers of food commodities for whom higher food prices would translate 
into better living standards.  As these groups become better nourished and more 
productive, long-term economic growth could be higher than before.  What policy 
interventions could help lock in the windfall of higher food prices into sustained higher 
standards of living?  Clearly one course of action would be to combine the policies 
proposed by de Janvry and Sadoulet to improve the productive potential of marginal net 
sellers and subsistence farmers with programs designed to improve the human capital of 
children in these households through interventions that would focus on nutrition, 




World food commodities prices have risen substantially in the past six years. 
The IMF’s index of internationally traded food commodities prices increased 130 
percent from January 2002 to July 2008. Individual agricultural commodities show even 
more pronounced increases. Although food prices have risen since 2002, the rate at 
which food prices increased accelerated in the past year. Between July 2007 and June 
2008 prices rose by 42 percent; this is equivalent to a third of the increase observed 
from January 2002 onwards in 15 percent of the time.
 Since July 2008, food 
commodities prices began to fall.  While this decline comes as a relief, prices are likely 
to stay high in the foreseeable future. 
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The increase in food commodities prices has been driven by three main factors.  
First, food commodities prices rose because of supply-side constraints while demand for 
food consumption continued to grow at the expected rates.  This caused a reversal in the 
long-term trend of declining food commodities prices whose first symptoms were felt at 
the beginning of this decade.   
 
Second, support policies for the production of biofuels implied a shift in demand 
for a subset of food commodities especially after 2005. In addition, rising energy prices 
resulted in higher costs for the production of food and, perhaps more importantly, in the 
opportunity cost of growing crops for food consumption purposes as opposed to inputs 
for the production of biofuels.  Idiosyncratic factors such as bad weather and disease 
exacerbated the pressures on specific years. The “discovery” of biofuels caused a 
structural shift in the demand and supply functions of grains and oilseeds (with both a 
horizontal and vertical shift in demand and a vertical shift in supply).  Everything else 
equal, the real price of food commodities is likely to stay higher, significantly higher 
than anticipated before this new source of demand came into the scene.  A corollary of 
the surge in biofuels, for the first time in history agricultural, energy, and environmental 
policies need to be integrated. 
 
 These factors are the “real” forces—that is, factors that affect the true 
opportunity cost of food commodities-- that are behind the reversal of the downward 
secular trend in food commodities prices. However, this is not the end of the story.  The 
acceleration in food commodities price increases since mid-2007, can be accounted for 
more by monetary factors (which affect the prices of all commodities, not just food) 
than forces affecting the “true” long-run opportunity cost of food commodities.  Among 
the monetary factors two stand out: the depreciation of the dollar and the fall in US 
interest rates.  The depreciation of the dollar has stimulated demand for commodities in 
the countries whose currencies appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar. In addition, suppliers 
have probably adjusted upwards their price in dollars to reduce their losses.  
 
However, prices of commodities rose in all “strong” currencies (albeit at a 
slower pace than in dollars), so other factors were at play.  One obvious candidate is the 
global inflationary pressures triggered by monetary policy in the United States   38
following the onset of the subprime mortgage crisis. Commodity prices tend to adjust 
faster than prices of manufacturing goods so when these prices catch-up or inflationary 
expectations are adjusted downward, the real commodity prices will return to their long-
run “true” equilibrium. Lower interest rates in the US led to portfolio shifts away from 
interest-bearing instruments into other assets including commodities.  This shift 
probably caused short-run prices of commodities to rise even further. Arbitrage 
conditions in the allocation of investment funds among alternative assets could explain 
how lower interest rates caused the transitory overshooting of nominal (and, of course, 
real commodity) prices experienced between October 2007 and July 2008.   
 
In sum, the recent acceleration in food commodities prices may be mostly a 
“monetary” phenomenon: that is, part of a global inflationary process and a reflection of 
the different velocities of adjustment in prices with commodities taking the lead.  The 
acceleration in price increases was exacerbated by policy interventions (such as export 
restrictions and general consumption subsidies or price controls) which curtailed the 
supply of some key food commodities in world markets that were already stressed by 
both “fundamentals” and the portfolio shifts triggered in the aftermath of the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the United States.  
 
One key policy dilemma is to what extent governments should allow the changes 
in international food commodities prices to be passed through to domestic prices.  Since 
as argued here, part of the increase is real, domestic prices in developing countries 
should gradually adjust to send the right signals to domestic producers and consumers. 
In the transition, these price increases should be accommodated as a once-and-for-all 
spike in inflation because the alternative—which might require other prices to fall in 
nominal terms—would be too costly in terms of foregone economic activity.    
 
Governments could resort to negotiating agreements or “pacts” with the business 
sector, labor unions and other groups’ representatives to avoid inflationary dynamics 
from becoming entrenched.  These agreements might be easier to obtain when the 
government commits to protecting low-income groups from the brunt of the price 
increases through cash transfers programs or targeted subsidies. In some cases, an 
agreement with the IMF in which the institution is tasked with monitoring whether 
monetary authorities and ministries of finance are treating the accommodation of the   39
rise in inflation as temporary could be a way to strengthen the credibility of central 
banks and preclude inflationary expectations from becoming entrenched. But if the 
effort to contain inflationary dynamics fails, tight monetary and fiscal policies will be 
inevitable. 
 
As suggested in this paper, however, not all the increase in international food 
commodities prices is a change in their relative price. There are reasons to believe that 
part of the increase reflects global inflationary pressures. In this case partially insulating 
domestic prices from their behavior in international markets is the appropriate policy 
response. One course of action is to allow the nominal exchange rate to appreciate.  This 
would imply that food commodities prices (and, therefore, food prices) in the domestic 
currency would rise more slowly or in the extreme case not rise at all.  As a result, real 
incomes would not suffer or not suffer as much as the increase in the international food 
commodities prices would imply.  
 
However, an exchange rate appreciation has its costs.  By lowering the domestic 
price of tradable goods, it creates disincentives to exporters and exposes domestic 
producers to unwarranted competition from cheaper imports.  Another course of action 
would be to use a combination of an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate with 
policies targeted to contain price increases of specific food commodities. These policies 
are of two kinds: those which use controls (such as price controls and export bans or 
restrictions) and those which use fiscal policy (such as reducing indirect taxes and 
tariffs, raising export taxes, increasing general subsidies and so on).  Policies that do not 
make use of controls are preferable on efficiency grounds. As a general proposition, 
governments should choose the price policy interventions which are more easily 
reversed (that is, they do not become hijacked by special interest groups), least 
distortionary, least regressive, more consistent with a rules-based trading system, simple 
to implement from an administrative point of view and do not cause unsustainable fiscal 
imbalance. 
 
Evidence shows that in most developing countries there has been a combination 
of inflation accommodation, appreciation of the exchange rate and targeted price 
interventions.  The latter have elicited quite a bit of criticism from the international 
organizations.  However, as argued in this paper, if they are temporary and used with   40
moderation, targeted price interventions may be an appropriate response to cope with 
external inflationary pressures and the large fluctuations that commodity prices 
experience in the process.  While it is true that these policies can exacerbate price 
increases in the international markets, in the absence of a multilateral response it should 
come as no surprise that countries choose unilateral protection.  A rules-based trading 
system should include safeguards and mechanisms which would make the protection of 
domestic consumers and producers from large—and recurrent-- food commodities price 
fluctuations (in either direction) orderly and legitimate.  One such mechanism is the 
creation of an international stock. 
 
The impact of rising food prices on poverty has been the subject of some debate.  
When food prices rise (fall) poor net consumers (poor net sellers) of food get hurt and 
poor net sellers (poor net consumers) are better off.  Available evidence suggests that in 
the majority of countries, an increase in food prices is likely to result in an increase in 
overall poverty. In this paper I argue that to concentrate on the net effect may not be the 
right approach. Governments and multilateral organizations should accept that there will 
always be part of the poor who get hurt—and often severely—by higher, or lower, food 
commodities prices.  The appropriate policy response is to have safety nets to help those 
who get hurt.   
 
In the present case, the best policy measure would be to compensate the net 
buyers for their loss in purchasing power in cash. However, many developing countries 
do not have cash transfers programs in place or when they do, their coverage is limited. 
Many countries do not have the fiscal resources or administrative capacity to launch 
such programs or expand their coverage. In addition, the cash transfers programs were 
not designed to cope with shocks. Their coverage does not expand automatically to 
incorporate those who became poor as a result of food price increases.  Nor is the size of 
the transfer increased automatically to compensate beneficiaries for the loss in 
purchasing power due to higher food prices.  Further analysis will be required to 
determine whether these programs can be used as an effective safety net in the event of 
food price (and other systemic) shocks and what would this entail in their institutional 
design. Multilateral organizations can help countries design, implement and finance an 
adequate safety net system to mitigate the impact of higher food prices on poor net 
consumers.   41
 
Since many of the extreme poor in low-income countries live in rural areas and 
between two thirds and three fourth of them have access to small plots of land, policy 
interventions that would further expand their access to land and increase the 
productivity of their plots could kill two birds with one stone. Greater access to 
improved seeds, fertilizers and small animals, credit to purchase inputs and land, and 
technical assistance could reduce the impact of higher food prices on the rural poor.  
These policies would lower the amount that must be purchased by them in the market 
and convert those with sufficient assets into self-sufficient farmers or even marginal net 
sellers. These measures would also help address the supply-side constraints on food 
commodity production for the extreme poor living in rural areas in low-income 
countries.  Multilateral organizations can help countries design, implement and fund 
programs whose main objective is to enhance the productive capacity, and thereby 
improve the food security, of millions of poor farmers throughout the developing world.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 



























Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
Notes: It refers to a Food Commodity Price Index including bananas, cereals, meat, vegetable oils, seafood, oranges 
and sugar.  Deflated by the US CPI.  
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Food Commodities Prices, January 2002-August 2008 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Commodity prices refer to: Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of 
Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per metric tonne; Rice, 5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, US$ per metric 
tonne; Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par, US$ per metric 
tonne; Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, US$ per metric tonne.  
 


















Source: Author's construction based on data from the PSD Database, USDA.Notes: Ratio is calculated using total domestic 
consumption and ending stocks. In top figure, right axis is for vegetable oils. For grains, it includes barley, corn, millet, mixed grain, 
oats, rice, rye, sorghum and wheat. For vegetable oils it includes coconut, cottonseed, olive, palm, palm kernel, peanut, rapeseed, 
soybean and sunflowerseed oils. The vertical line indicates the date after which the stocks-to-use ratio undergoes a relatively sharp 





































































































































































































































Corn Soybeans Wheat Rice  44
























































Source: Author's construction based on the IMF Primary Commodities Database and USDA Feedgrains Database. 
Information for mandates is from Table 3. 
Notes: Prices refer to Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price (average of daily quotations). 
Calculations of corn for fuel are for the United States. Corn prices for 2008 are averages from January 2008 to July 
2008. 
 





































































Source: Author's construction based on IMF Primary Commodity Database and Renewable Fuels Association. 
Information for mandates is from Table 3. 
Notes: Ethanol production is for the United States. Prices refer to Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of 
Mexico, U.S. price (average of daily quotations); Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures contract (first 
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Figure 7. Gasoline prices and U.S. ethanol production, 1995-2007 
 
Source: Elliott (2008). 
 
 



























































































































Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database. Export policies from Slayton and Timmer (2008) and Timmer 
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Source: Author’s construction based on data from the International Financial Statistics, IMF.  
Notes: The real effective exchange rate (RER) refers to the US real exchange rate (2000=100) based on RNULC 
(Relative Normalised Unit Labour Cost). Food prices refer to a food commodities price index (2000=100).  
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Source: Author’s construction based on data from the IMF Primary Commodity Prices Database and 
Federal Reserve.  
Notes: Vertical lines shows periods in which the Fed's primary credit rate was lowered as specified in the 
graph's text. The primary credit rate fell from 6.25 in June 2007 to 2.25 in June 2008 (the discount rate is 
the interest rate charged by the Fed to commercial banks and other depository institutions on short-term 
loans (overnight)). The federal funds rate started to fall in August 2007 (after stability since mid-2006) 
from 5.02 to 2.01 by July 2008 (“the federal funds rate is the interest rate at which depository institutions 
lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions overnight”; for more information 
visit www.federalreserve.gov). IMF prices for each product refer to: (i) Maize (corn), U.S. No.2 Yellow, 
FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price (average of daily quotations); (ii) Soybeans, U.S. soybeans, Chicago 
Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 yellow and par (average of daily quotations); (iii) 
Wheat, No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico (average of daily quotations). 
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Figure 12. Real Interest Rate and Real Food Commodity Prices, January 2007 – July 2008 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction with data from the IMF Primary Commodity Database and IMF International Financial 
Statistics. 
Notes: Real interest rate is the Federal Funds Rate adjusted for previous year (12-month) inflation. The food 
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Figure 13. Food Protests, January 2007-May 2008 
 
Source: From Von Braun (2008d). 
Notes: Von Braun (2008) considers as non-violent food protests the strikes, protests, riots on food or agriculture 
related issues (since Jan. 2007) and as violent food protest  those involving the use of physical force and/or resulting 
























































































































Figure 14. Number of Countries with Positive and Negative Impact on Current 




























Source: Author's construction based on data from IMF (2008)- Tables 1a and 1b.  
Notes: Positive and negative price shock refers to changes in the current account (as % of GDP) equal to or larger 
than 0.5 in each direction. The total number of countries considered is 62 for food shocks and 61 for combined 
shocks for the IMF’S Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) eligible countries and 69 middle-income 
countries. Countries with missing information are not included. PRGF-eligible countries are those eligible for the 
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Source: From IMF (2008).  
 






















Source: Author’s construction with information from the World Bank (2008d) and expanded with Trostle (2008), 











Figure17. The Food Crisis: Safety Nets in Low and  Middle-Income Countries 
 
Source: Author’s construction with information from the World Bank (2008d) and expanded with ADB (2008) and 
World Bank (2008e). Income classification data from the World Bank. The World Bank classifies 49 countries as 
low-income and 95 as middle-income; in the graph are those countries that implemented one or more programs (30 
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Table 2. World Demand and Supply Summary: Corn, Wheat, Rice and Soybeans 







































































































Source: Author’s elaboration based on “*” Mitchell (2008), Abbott et al. and own calculations based on USDA data.  
a. Ethanol is produced from sugar crops, such as sugar cane or beets, or starchy crops such as maize. Biodiesel is produced from 
vegetable oils or animal fats. 
b. The United States is the largest producer of ethanol from maize and is expected to use about 81 million tons for ethanol in the 
2007/08 crop year. Canada, China and the European Union used roughly an additional 5 million tons of maize for ethanol in 2007 
(USDA 2008a), bringing the total use of maize for ethanol to 86 million tons, about 11% of global maize production. The U.S. 
accounts for about one-third of global maize production and two-thirds of global exports and used 25 percent of its production for 
ethanol in 2007/08. The largest biodiesel producers were the European Union, the United States, Argentina, Australia, and Brazil, 
with a combined use of vegetable oils for biodiesel of about 8.6 million tons in 2007 compared with global vegetable oils production 
of 132 million tons. (Mitchell, 2008)   55
 






Feed 69 64 27
FSI 31 36 73
Corn for Fuel* 12 23 78
Food 85 80 54
Industrial 14 19 46





Source: Own calculations with the PSD Database and the Feed Grains Database, USDA.  
Notes: Data for vegetable oils is for the world. Data for corn is for the world except for the corn for fuel data (*) 
which is a subcategory for the US only.  FSI refers to Food, Seed and Industrial uses.    56
Table 4. Poverty Impacts of Recent Increases in Food Prices: A Summary of Available 
Studies 
 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) Wodon et al. (2008) ADB (2008) IADB (2008) CEPAL (2008)
RESULTS
Poverty increases in all 
countries with the 
exception of Peru. The 
2005-2008Q1 price 
increase scenario 
increases national poverty 
rates by 4.5 percentage 
points on average 
(calculating estimates for 
all low income countries: 
additional 105 million 
people in poverty). 
Poverty increases. A 50% 
increase in prices leads to 
an average increase of the 
headcount poverty of 4.4 
percentage points (or 2.5 
with producer impacts). An 
average increase of 3.5 
percentage points at the 
national level in SSA would 




in the short-term. In 
the medium-term it 
depends. A 20% food 
price increase in 
Philippines and 
Pakistan increases 
the number of poor 
by 5.65 and 14.67 
million, respectively. 
Poverty increases by 
4.3 percentage points 
or  21 million additional 
poor individuals (net 
effect)*. For example, 
total income poverty 
increases by 8 
percentage points in 
Guatemala (net effect 
of intl. price increase), 
6.9 in Mexico and 6.5 
in El Salvador
Indigence increases 
from 12.7 (68.5 million 
people) to 14.7 (79.1 
million people) with 
income effects. 
Poverty increases 
from 35.1 (189.5 
million people) to 37 






Peru, Vietnam and Zambia
Burkina Faso, DRC, Ghana, 
Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 





Nineteen countries in 
LAC
Estimates are for 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a whole
METHOD
Short-term impact; 
Deaton's framework and 
GTAP for wage effects





with budget shares 
only and no income 
shares; medium term 




Upper bound increase 
poverty line by 30% 
(multiplication of 
increase in world 
prices of commodities 
(.68) times average 
share of six food 
commodities (.435) 
while rest of prices are 
assumed unchanged). 
Lower bound assumes 
an increase in 
agricultural workers' 
income equal to world 
price increases
Not described in note 





Upper bound estimates 
include net-buyers only; 
lower bound estimates 
assume net-sellers receive 
price increase in full
Short-term estimates 
includes buyers only; 
medium-term CGE 
should include effects 
on net sellers
No No














Three simulations: 1. 10% 
uniform increase/pass 
through equal to 1; 2. 
2005-07 actual FAO/pass 
through .66; 3. 2005-
2008Q1**
Simulate price increases of 
25% and 50%; price 
increases are the same for 
all countries and all food 
items
Simulate food price 
increases of 10%, 
20% and 30% 
Simulates the impact of 
the IFS estimate of 
price increases for six 
commodities from Jan 
06 to March 08 
(68.1%); full pass 
through to domestic 
prices. Also, simulates 
price increases 
estimated by central 
banks
Assumes a 15% 
increase in food 
prices











Headcount ratio and 
poverty gap ratio
Headcount ratio
Change in absolute 
number of poor; Gini 
coefficient
Headcount ratio and 
poverty gap ratio
Headcount ratio and 




Poverty line; price 
increases; labor market 
segmentation
Simulation of two levels of 
price increases and upper 
and lower bounds
Simulation of three 
levels of price 
increases
None that are 
mentioned
None that are 
mentioned
 
* Own calculations based on the paper.  
** For the 2005 to 2008.Q1 authors attempted to at what had actually happened to domestic prices. If a currency had 
appreciated against the USD, then the domestic price increase for these commodities was assumed to be smaller than 
the increase in $ and we first made that adjustment. If other prices had increased, and we tracked this using 
inflation over the period, then the increase in food prices had to be compared relative to that increase in prices. So 
there were two adjustments-- one for the exchange rate and one for increases in the general price level.  
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